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Abstract:  
This article analyses the protection which two EU Directives, adopted in 2000, provide against 
discrimination on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation. This protection is not the same for all these grounds and this has led to what is often 
referred to in the literature as a hierarchy of discrimination grounds. The article examines these 
differences in protection against discrimination and the reasons for them and includes an analysis of 
the influence of the case law of the CJEU on the development of this area of law. The argument in 
this article is that the CJEU has generally given a purposive and expansive interpretation to the 
provisions and has expanded the protection against discrimination in many cases, but three recent 
cases seem to form an exception to this. Possible reasons for this recent reticence are given.  
Introduction  
In 2000, the EU adopted two directives against discrimination: Directive 2000/43/EC,1 prohibiting 
racial and ethnic origin discrimination, and Directive 2000/78/EC,2 prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. This was the first time the EU 
legislated against these grounds of discrimination, in contrast to the EU provisions for equal pay 
between men and women and measures against sex discrimination which have been in place much 
longer.3 This article will not discuss the protection provided against sex discrimination because its 
focus is on the novel grounds of discrimination introduced in EU law in 2000. It was held that the EU 
did not have the competence to act against discrimination on the wider grounds beyond sex 
discrimination, but this was remedied by the Treaty of Amsterdam which created this competence, 
resulting in the adoption of the above Directives in 2000. However, the protection is not the same 
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for all these grounds and this has led to what is often referred to as a hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds. This hierarchy and the possible reasons behind it are analysed. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) case law has been very influential on the development of this area of EU law 
and this forms part of the analysis. The argument is that the CJEU has generally given a purposive 
interpretation to the provisions and has expanded the protection against discrimination in many 
cases, but three recent cases – Parris,4 Achbita5 and Bougnaoui6 - seem to form an exception to this 
as the CJEU has given a rather more restricted interpretation of the Directives. The following 
addresses possible reasons for this as well as what this means for the hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds and, more generally, for the protection against discrimination provided by EU law, including 
the risks of not applying EU anti-discrimination law in a uniform way. 
It must be noted that this article does not intend to give a complete overview of all case law 
of the CJEU under the two Directives. Rather, it focuses on analysing a number of cases in which the 
CJEU has clarified and extended the protection against discrimination and, in this way, has made the 
directives more effective tools to combat discrimination.  
The article starts, part I, with an analysis of the hierarchy of discrimination grounds created 
by the two Directives. This is followed in part II, by an examination of a number of cases of the CJEU 
in which the Court has clarified concepts or in other ways has moved the protection provided 
forwards. Then, in part III, an analysis of the three recent cases in which the CJEU appears to have 
stopped going forwards by giving a restrictive interpretation is undertaken, including the possible 
reasons for this change in the Court’s approach. 
I Hierarchy of discrimination grounds  
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, in force in 1999, introduced Article 13 (now Article 19 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) into the EC treaty. This Article created the competence 
for the EU to adopt measures against discrimination on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. In 2000, two Directives against discrimination 
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based on this Article were adopted: Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC. Both Directive prohibit 
direct discrimination,7 indirect discrimination,8 harassment,9 victimisation10 and instruction to 
discriminate11 and define these concepts in the same way.  
But, the protection provided by these two Directives against discrimination is not the same 
for all grounds covered and this has led to a so-called hierarchy of discrimination grounds (Barry, 
2003; Bell and Waddington 2003; Flynn, 1999; Howard, 2007; Schiek, 2002; Waddington and Bell 
2001). This hierarchy is said to exist because Directive 2000/43/EC provides stronger protection 
against racial or ethnic origin discrimination than Directive 2000/78/EC provides for discrimination 
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.  There are three reasons 
for this: first, Directive 2000/78/EC covers only the areas of employment and occupation (Article 3 
Directive 2000/78/EC), while the scope of Directive 2000/43/EC is much wider and, apart from 
employment and occupation, also covers social protection, including social security and healthcare, 
social advantages, education and access to and supply of goods and services that are available to the 
public, including housing (Article 3 Directive 2000/43/EC).  
Second, Article 13 Directive 2000/43/EC imposes a duty on Member States to designate a 
body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, but there is no such duty in Directive 2000/78/EC, although, many 
EU countries have equality bodies which cover all grounds of discrimination prohibited by their 
national law (Chopin and Germaine, 2017, 108-114). 
Third, under Directive 2000/43/EC, direct discrimination cannot be justified except in two 
explicitly specified circumstances given in the Directive (genuine and determining occupational 
requirements (Article 4) and positive action (Article 5)). Under Directive 2000/78/EC, direct 
discrimination can be justified for the same reasons (Articles 4(1) and 7, respectively), but other 
justifications are also provided for. There is an exception for churches and other organisations with 
an ethos based on religion or belief (Article 4(2)); reasonable accommodation must be made for 
people with a disability (Article 5); direct discrimination on the ground of age can be justified in a 
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number of situations (Article 6); and, Article 2(5) contains a general justification clause (Howard, 
2007: 447-449; Watson, 2012, 1477-1478).  
There is a Proposal from the European Commission from 2008 (COM (2008) 426) to extend 
the protection against discrimination on the grounds covered by Directive 2000/78/EC to all areas 
covered by Directive 2000/43/EC. This proposal also requires Member States to designate a body for 
these grounds of discrimination. So, if adopted, two of the differences mentioned above would be 
removed. The Commission stated, in the Communication accompanying this Proposal (COM (2008) 
420: under 2.2) that ‘when it comes to protection against discrimination there can be no hierarchy’ 
and that the proposed Directive, once adopted, ‘will bring to an end any perception of a hierarchy of 
protection’. But it also considered that ‘the various grounds of discrimination differ substantively, 
and each demands a tailored response. This is not a question of creating a hierarchy between the 
various grounds, but of delivering the most appropriate form of protection for each of them’ (COM 
(2008) 420: under 2.2). 
  However, as Watson (2012: 1479) writes, this proposal ‘will not bring the protection for 
victims of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation on 
all fours with victims of racial or ethnic origin discrimination’ and, because the scope is narrower, 
‘inequalities between victims of discrimination may continue’. The proposed Directive would thus 
still leave some differences. However, this is a moot point, as the proposal has not been adopted yet 
as the unanimity which is required has not been reached so far. Bell (2011: 620) writes that ‘it seems 
that many Member States are reluctant to accept the broad-brush approach to material scope which 
was assumed in the rushed negotiation of the Racial Equality Directive [Directive 2000/43/EC]’.  
Because of the differences in protection against discrimination on the different grounds, EU 
law is said to create a hierarchy of discrimination grounds with some receiving better protection 
than others. Based on the differences mentioned above, racial or ethnic origin discrimination should 
be placed at the top of this hierarchy of the grounds introduced in 2000 because of its wide material 
scope. Sex discrimination is prohibited in employment and occupation by Directive 2006/54/EC and, 
5 
 
in the access to and supply of goods and services by Directive 2004/113/EC, so the material scope is 
less wide than that of Directive 2000/43/EC. In this sense, sex as a discrimination ground can be 
placed just under racial and ethnic origin. On the other hand, it can be argued that sex discrimination 
should be placed at the top of the hierarchy, as it was prohibited in the EU from a much earlier date 
and as the protection has been developed further by the CJEU over the years since its introduction. 
Another reason to place sex discrimination at the top would be that Member States are also under a 
duty to designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. However, irrespective of where sex discrimination is placed, of 
the grounds introduced in 2000, which are in the focus of this article, racial and ethnic origin is 
clearly at the top of the hierarchy. 
Directive 2000/43/EC was adopted in record time, just over a year after the Community 
competence was established and within seven months of the proposal being published. Directive 
2000/78/EC was adopted quite quickly as well, but still five months later than Directive 2000/43/EC. 
The wide coverage and quick adoption of the latter can be linked to the strong political will to do 
something about racial discrimination at the time which was influenced by the February 2000 
elections in Austria, which resulted in Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party, an extreme right-wing party, 
becoming part of the government. The other Member States protested against this and imposed 
bilateral diplomatic sanctions and Directive 2000/43/EC was then fast-tracked to signal the Union’s 
and the Member States’ commitment to combating racism (Bell, 2002: 74; Ellis, 2002, 293-294; 
Guild, 2000: 416; Howard, 2010, 22-23). There also seemed to be a favourable environment for anti-
race discrimination law at the time: there was the planned EU enlargement and the wish to create a 
strong anti-discrimination acquis before the entrant states became members (Bell, 2002: 180: Ellis, 
2002: 293-294). Race discrimination was also on the global agenda, with the preparations for the UN 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which 
took place in 2001. Therefore, there was a strong political will to adopt a directive against racial 
discrimination (Howard, 2010: 22-23; Watson, 2012: 1459). And, although it might have been 
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political expediency, at least Directive 2000/43/EC has a wide coverage. If all grounds mentioned in 
Article 19 TFEU had been in one directive, then EU legislation against racial and ethnic origin 
discrimination might not have gone beyond the area of employment and occupation, given the 
problems with reaching consensus between the Member States about the proposal to extend the 
scope of Directive 2000/78/EC. Similar problems might also be behind the reticence of the CJEU in 
Achbita and Bougnaoui, the two cases concerning religion and belief discrimination, as will be 
discussed below. 
In the hierarchy of discrimination grounds, age can be considered to be at the bottom 
because Article 6 Directive 2000/78/EC allows justification of direct age discrimination, while it does 
not allow for justification of direct discrimination on the other grounds (Waddington and Bell, 2001: 
610). Because of this and because most of the CJEU case law on age discrimination concerns the 
justification of direct discrimination and is thus not always relevant for the other grounds of 
discrimination, age will not be discussed in the following. 
But where do the other three grounds, religion or belief, disability and sexual orientation, fit 
in the hierarchy? It could be argued that disability should be at the top of these three grounds, 
because Article 5 Directive 2000/78/EC imposes a duty to make reasonable accommodation on 
employers of disabled employees unless this imposes a disproportionate burden on the employer. 
According to Article 5, ‘this means that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in 
a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in 
employment, or to undergo training’. There is no similar duty for other grounds of discrimination, 
although it has been suggested that such a duty could also be useful for other grounds (Council of 
Europe, 2011: para.6.1, point 2; Equinet, 2008: 8).  The recent judgments of the CJEU on the wearing 
of the Muslim headscarf at work, Achbita and Bougnaoui, could suggest that religion or belief 
discrimination would come just above age discrimination and below disability and sexual orientation 
discrimination. The following section on the case law of the CJEU examines this.  
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II Case law of the CJEU: clarification and expansion 
This part examines a number of cases of the CJEU and analyses whether the case law contributes to 
or enforces the hierarchy of discrimination grounds or whether it challenges it instead. The 
argument here is that the CJEU has generally given a purposive interpretation to the provisions of 
the 2000 Directives and has expanded the protection against discrimination in many cases, but that 
three recent cases seem to form an exception to this. Possible reasons for this recent reticence are 
given and the consequences for the hierarchy are discussed.  
a Clarifying and expanding concepts 
In a number of cases, the CJEU has clarified and expanded concepts which are common to both 
Directives. For example, in CHEZ,12 the CJEU clarified the difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination: there is direct discrimination when the discrimination ground determines the 
decision for the less favourable treatment or, in other words, where the less favourable treatment is 
by reason of that ground; while indirect discrimination considers the effect of a measure, which is 
‘ostensibly’ neutral or neutral ‘at first glance’ (CHEZ: para. 109). 
In this same case, the CJEU also expanded the protection provided by the two Directives by 
making clear that discrimination by association is covered (CHEZ: para. 56). Discrimination by 
association occurs where someone is discriminated against because of their association with 
someone to whom a discrimination ground applies. The facts in Coleman13 illustrate what this 
means: the mother of a disabled son suffered detriment at work because she had to take time off to 
look after her son. The CJEU held that this was covered by disability discrimination under Directive 
2000/78/EC because ‘the principle of equal treatment enshrined in the directive in that area applies 
not to a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1’ 
(Coleman, para. 38). 
In Coleman, there was direct discrimination and harassment by association but, in CHEZ, the 
CJEU held that indirect discrimination by association was also covered (CHEZ: para. 56). Chez 
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concerned a Bulgarian electricity company, which put up electricity meters in residential areas. 
These meters were generally put at a height of 1.7 metres, but, in neighbourhoods with 
predominantly Roma inhabitants, the meters were placed at a height of 6 to 7 metres. The reason 
given by the company was that this was to prevent tampering and unlawful connections to the 
electricity network. A shopkeeper in one of these Roma neighbourhoods, Ms Nikolova, who was 
herself not of Roma ethnic origin, complained that she had been discriminated against on the 
ground of racial or ethnic origin because she suffered the same disadvantage as her Roma 
neighbours.14 Coleman concerned Directive 2000/78/EC while CHEZ concerned Directive 
2000/43/EC, but both directives define direct, indirect discrimination and harassment in the same 
terms, so the decisions apply to both Directives.  
The reasoning in Coleman (para. 38), mentioned above, that the principle of equal treatment 
applies by reference to the grounds, would suggest that the Directives also prohibit ‘discrimination 
by perception’, discrimination because someone perceives a person to be, for example, of a 
particular ethnic origin or sexual orientation, when they are not, because such discrimination would 
be on the ground of racial or ethnic origin or sexual orientation (see also: Ellis and Watson, 2012: 
146-147). Benedi Lahuerta (2016: 810-811) argues that ‘CHEZ suggest that the EU concept of 
discrimination by association includes [italics in original] discrimination by perception’.  
Therefore, the CJEU has explained the meaning of direct and indirect discrimination and has 
accepted that both Directives cover direct and indirect discrimination and harassment by association 
and, as was argued, by perception. 
b Racial and ethnic origin 
Two important cases concerning the interpretation of Directive 2000/43/EC are analysed in this part. 
The first is Feryn,15 where one of the directors of a company installing garage and security doors, 
made a statement on local radio that, although the company was seeking to recruit new employees, 
they could not employ ‘immigrants’ because customers were reluctant to give them access to their 
private residences for the duration of the works. The CJEU held that such a statement concerning 
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candidates of a particular ethnic or racial origin constituted direct discrimination under Article 
2(2)(a) Directive 2000/43/EC, because such a public declaration was clearly likely to dissuade some 
candidates from applying for jobs with this employer (Feryn, para. 25). The CJEU also made clear 
that, under EU law, a complaint can be made without there being an individually identified victim 
(Feryn, para. 25). There does not seem to be any reason why both these interpretations would not 
also apply to Directive 2000/78/EC. 
 Article 8(1) Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 10(1)Directive 2000/78/EC determine that the 
burden of proving discrimination shifts to the discriminating party once the person alleging 
discrimination has established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been 
discrimination. In Feryn, the CJEU held that statements made in public, like those made in this case, 
were enough for a presumption of the existence of a discriminatory employment policy, and that 
thus the burden of proof shifted to the employer who had to prove that its recruitment policy was 
not discriminatory (Feryn, paras 31-32). This is the same for Directive 2000/78/EC, as was held in 
ACCEPT (paras 53 and 62),16 a case concerning sexual orientation discrimination.  
The second important case here is CHEZ, where the CJEU explained the concept of ethnicity: 
this concept has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked in particular by common nationality, 
religious faith, language, cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds. The Court held that this 
applies to the Roma community (Chez, para. 46; Benedi Lahuerta, 2016: 805-807). This definition 
was repeated in Jyske Finans A/S (para. 17).17 However, in the latter case, the CJEU held that a 
difference in treatment based solely on a person’s country of birth, which was not linked to any of 
the characteristics mentioned in the above definition, does not fall under the definition of ethnicity 
and thus does not breach Directive 2000/43/EC (Jyske, para. 20).  
Therefore, the CJEU in these cases was willing to interpret the Directives broadly and to 




The absence of a clear definition of disability in Directive 2000/78/EC has given rise to case law. 
Initially, the CJEU appeared to give a rather narrow interpretation of this term. In Chacon Navas,18 
the claimant was off work because of sickness when she was dismissed. She claimed disability 
discrimination under Directive 2000/78/EC. The CJEU held that the concept of disability in the 
Directive, ‘must be understood as referring to a limitation that results in particular from physical, 
mental or psychological impairments and that hinders the participation of the person concerned in 
professional life’ (Chacon Navas, para 43). The Court went on to declare that disability was a term 
that differed from sickness and that implied that the impairment must last over a long period of 
time, and concluded that the Directive was not applicable as soon as a person developed a sickness 
(Chacon Navas, paras 44–46). Therefore, Ms Chacon Navas’ treatment did not fall under the 
Directive. The case was criticised for giving a rather restrictive interpretation of the term ‘disability’ 
(Hosking, 2007; Waddington, 2007; Watson, 2012: 1463).  
However, since this case, the EU has signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2006 (CRPD)19 and, in Ring and Werge (para. 32),20 the CJEU held that 
Directive 2000/78/EC must be interpreted in a manner consistent with this Convention. The CJEU 
gave a wide definition of disability which follows the definition in Article 1 CRPD: the concept of 
‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, 
mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full 
and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers; and, the impairment must be long-term (Ring and Werge, paras 38-39). The CJEU noted 
that a curable or incurable illness which resulted in the above limitation and which was long-term 
fell within the concept of ‘disability’ (Ring and Werge, para. 41). The Court also considered that an 
illness which is not long term and does not result in a limitation, would not constitute a disability; 
that a person with a disability who was only able to work part-time was capable of being covered by 
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the concept; and, that there was no condition that an individual required accommodation to be 
regarded as disabled (Ring and Werge, paras 42-45).  
In Ring and Werge, the CJEU also clarified the concept of reasonable accommodation in 
Article 5 Directive 2000/78/EC and held that ‘such measures are intended to accommodate the 
needs of disabled persons. They are therefore the consequence, not the constituent element, of the 
concept of disability’ and that they do not apply unless there is a disability (Ring and Werge, para. 
46). Referring to the CRPD, the CJEU also held that the concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’ must 
be defined widely and includes not only material but also organisational measures; and, that a 
reduction in working hours could be seen as a form of reasonable accommodation (Ring and Werge, 
paras 53-56 and 64). 
Waddington writes that the definition in Chacon Navas was criticised for being based on the 
medical model of disability, while the Ring and Werge judgment can be seen as embracing the social 
model of disability which is reflected in the CRPD and ‘which argues that disability stems primarily 
from the failure of the social environment to adjust to the needs and aspirations of people with 
impairments, rather than from the inability of people with impairments to adapt to the 
environment’ as the medical model does (Waddington, 2013: 18-19; see also: Betsch, 2013). The 
CJEU’s explanation of the reasonable accommodation measures also fits better within the social 
model of disability. The judgment, therefore, improves the protection provided against disability 
discrimination and, in doing so, establishes discrimination just below racial and ethnic origin in the 
hierarchy of discrimination grounds.21 
d Sexual orientation discrimination and same sex partnerships 
In a number of cases concerning sexual orientation discrimination,22 the CJEU has established that 
the Member States remain free to decide whether or not to institute and recognise same-sex 
partnerships in their national law; but, once the national law does recognise such relationships as 
comparable to that of spouses, then the principle of equal treatment on the ground of sexual 
orientation in Directive 2000/78/EC applies and, if registered same-sex partners are treated 
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differently from opposite-sex married partners, then this will constitute direct sexual orientation 
discrimination. So, if married opposite-sex partners and registered same-sex partners are in a 
comparable situation they must be treated the same way. It is up to the national courts to decide on 
whether their situations are comparable.  
This can be seen as moving the protection against sexual orientation discrimination forward. 
However, the CJEU does not push for the Member States to introduce any form of legal recognition 
of same sex relationships. The reason for this might be found in Recital 22, Preamble, Directive 
2000/78/EC, which the CJEU refers to and which determines that ‘this Directive is without prejudice 
to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent thereon’. The Commission’s proposal 
extending the protection provided beyond employment (COM (2008) 426), follows the same line and 
explicitly states that it  remains for Member States alone to decide whether to recognise same-sex 
marriages (COM (2008) 426, under 2 and 3). 
However, the CJEU might soon have to clarify this position in relation to the free movement 
provisions in EU law in Coman.23 Mr Coman, a Romanian, married his American male partner in 
Belgium in 2010. The Romanian authorities told him that a residence permit for his spouse would be 
refused because the Romanian Civil Code bans the recognition of same-sex marriages performed 
abroad. If Mr Coman’s spouse had been a woman, she would have been entitled to a residence 
permit. Mr Coman claimed that the failure to recognise his marriage breached his free movement 
rights and constituted sexual orientation discrimination, contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EUCFR). One of the questions referred to the CJEU concerned whether the word ‘spouse’ in 
Directive 2004/38/EC24 includes same-sex partners. Advocate General Wathelet expressed the 
opinion that the term ‘spouse’ in this Directive should equally apply to same-sex and opposite-sex 
marriages.25  
If the CJEU follows this, it does not mean that all Member States have to provide for legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships in their national legislation, but it would mean that they would 
have to recognise a same-sex marriage validly contracted in another Member State in situations 
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which fall within the scope of EU Law (Cranmer, 2018: MacMahon Baldwin, 2018: Tryfonidou, 2017). 
Cranmer (2018) concludes that Advocate General Wathelet’s opinion, together with developments 
in the US and in the European Court of Human Rights ‘would suggest that there is a growing 
international legal consensus that same-sex couples have equal rights with opposite-sex couples’. 
MacMahon Baldwin (2018) suggests that, in Coman, there will be a debate in the CJEU about ‘what 
level of Member State concensus [sic] is required to trigger a dynamic interpretation based on 
present day conditions’. However, he continues that ‘although there is indeed a real trend in favour 
of complete equality by way of recognizing same-sex marriage, half of the Member States still do not 
allow for it’. MacMahon Baldwin (2018) concludes that ‘critical members of the CJEU will be 
questioning whether the Advocate General’s opinion is simply reacting to a change in society or 
rather seeking to drive it by imposing a development in Western Europe upon the rest of the Union’ 
[italics in original]. The CJEU could, by following the opinion of the Advocate General, make a big 
step forward in protecting same sex couples against sexual orientation discrimination and it is hoped 
that it will do so. If it does not, then a mixed picture emerges in relation to sexual orientation 
discrimination: it can then be said that some steps have been made to expand this protection, but 
that the Coman judgment limits it. Not following the Advocate General’s opinion would place sexual 
orientation as a discrimination ground below racial and ethnic origin and disability discrimination.  
III Case Law of the CJEU: Limitations on the scope of protection 
Many of the cases analysed so far have explained and enhanced the scope of the protection against 
discrimination provided by Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC and the Coman case offers the 
CJEU an opportunity to give a similar expansive interpretation to the protection against sexual 
orientation discrimination. Overall, it can be concluded from the above that the CJEU has shown a 
willingness to interpret the Directives in a purposive and expansive way. However, as the following 
section illustrates, three recent cases – Parris, Acbhita and Bougnaoui - go against this trend as they 
limit the scope of protection provided.  
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a Parris v Trinity College Dublin 
In Parris, the CJEU limited the scope provided by Directive 2000/78/EC by rejecting a claim for 
discrimination on a combination of grounds. Mr Parris, a former lecturer of Trinity College Dublin, 
claimed that the university discriminated against him on grounds of sexual orientation and age. The 
university’s pension scheme provided for the payment of a survivor’s pension to the spouse or civil 
partner of the pension scheme member as long as the marriage or civil partnership had been 
entered into before the member reached the age of 60. Although Mr Parris and his partner had been 
in a relationship for more than 30 years, they entered into a civil partnership in the UK in 2009 when 
Mr Parris was 63. This civil partnership could only be recognised in Ireland in 2011 when the Civil 
Partnership Act 2010 entered into force. This was just after Mr Parris had retired. Before he retired, 
he requested that, in the event of his death, the survivor’s pension would be paid to his partner, but 
the university rejected this.  
The CJEU held that there was no sexual orientation discrimination and no age discrimination. 
And, while recognising that discrimination may be based on several grounds, it held that no new 
category of discrimination could exist where discrimination on either one of the grounds had not 
been established (Parris, paras 80 and 81). The CJEU thus appears to have rejected a claim for 
multiple or intersectional discrimination, a claim based on a combination of discrimination grounds, 
if there is no discrimination on either of the individual grounds. This restricts the protection provided 
by the Directives, even though the Court itself accepts that discrimination can be based on more 
than one ground. In practice, this means that people who are discriminated against because of a 
combination of grounds could be left without a remedy, if they cannot prove discrimination on 
either one of the grounds, as was the case with Mr Parris. According to Trifonidou (2016), the 
decision ‘demonstrates the ECJ’s failure to accept the reality of multiple discrimination’. The case 
can thus be seen as a restriction on the protection against discrimination provided by the Directives. 
It is unfortunate that the CJEU did not follow the opinion of Advocate General Kokkott,26 who 
concluded that there was indirect sexual orientation discrimination, as well as direct age 
15 
 
discrimination; and, she stressed that particular attention needed to be given to the fact that the 
discrimination was ‘attributable to a combination of two factors, age and sexual orientation’; and, 
pointed out that ‘the Court’s judgment will reflect real life only if it duly analyses the combination of 
those two factors, rather than considering each of the factors of age and sexual orientation in 
isolation’ (Opinion AG Kokott, Parris, para. 4). Kokott concluded that there was indirect 
discrimination on the combined grounds of sexual orientation and age, even if it turned out that 
discrimination on the ground of age alone or of sexual orientation alone was not present (Opinion 
AG Kokott, Parris, paras 147-159). The CJEU decision also goes against what the EU Commission 
stated in its 2014 report on the Directives, that ‘the Directives already allow a combination of two or 
more grounds of discrimination to be tackled in the same situations’(COM (2014) 2, para. 4.4). By 
not following this or the opinion of the Advocate General, the CJEU has limited the protection 
provided against discrimination in EU law. 
b Religion and belief: Achbita and Bougnaoui  
The last two cases analysed here are Achbita and Bougnaoui.27 Both concerned Muslim women who 
wanted to wear a headscarf to work and, when their employer asked them to remove the headscarf, 
they refused to do so and were dismissed. Ms Achbita was a receptionist working for G4S who was 
permanently contracted out to a third party. When she told her employer that she wanted to start 
wearing a Muslim headscarf at work, G4S said that this was against the rule that workers could not 
wear visible signs of their political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace. The Belgian 
Court of Cassation asked the CJEU whether this rule constituted direct discrimination (Achbita, para. 
21). Ms Bougnaoui worked as a design engineer for Micropole and she occasionally went out to work 
at customers’ sites. She was asked to remove her headscarf after a customer’s staff member 
complained about it. The French Court of Cassation asked the CJEU whether the wish of a customer 
no longer to have services provided by an employee wearing a headscarf, was a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement (Bougnaoui, para. 19). 
16 
 
 The CJEU appears to send out mixed messages in these cases. On the one hand, it held that 
the term ‘religion’ must be interpreted broadly and accepted that the wearing of a Muslim headscarf 
fell within the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC (Achbita, para.  28; Bougnaoui, para. 30). The CJEU also 
held that the wish of a customer not to be served by someone in a headscarf was not a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement (Bougnaoui, paras 40-41). Article 4(1) Directive 2000/78/EC 
contains an exception for genuine and determining occupational requirements and determines that, 
whether such a requirement is present depends on the nature of the occupational activities and the 
context in which these are carried out; and, the occupational requirement must be proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued. In rejecting the wish of a customer as a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, the CJEU followed its own settled case law that exceptions to the 
principle of equal treatment must be interpreted strictly.28 According to Loenen (2017: 64), the 
decision that Article 4(1) Directive 2000/78/EC is not applicable, ‘seems a convincing reasoning, as it 
appears hard to argue that the wearing of the headscarf interferes with the professional 
performance of Bougnaoui as an IT-engineer’ (See also: Opinion AG Sharpston, Bougnaoui, para. 
102).  
Both the definition of religion or belief and the restrictive application of the occupational 
requirement expand the protection provided against religion or belief discrimination. However, 
other parts of the judgments can be seen as restricting this protection. In Achbita, the CJEU held that 
there was no direct discrimination because the internal rule referred ‘to the wearing of visible signs 
of political, philosophical or religious beliefs’ and thus covered ‘any manifestation of such beliefs 
without distinction’. The rule was treating all workers the same and there was no evidence that the 
rule was applied differently to Ms Achbita (Achbita, paras 30-32). In Bougnaoui, the CJEU stated that 
it was not clear whether the referred question was based on a finding of a direct or indirect 
discrimination. It then went on to point out, as it had done in Achbita and with a reference to that 
case, that it was for the referring court to decide whether the dismissal was directly or indirectly 
discriminatory (Bougnaoui, paras 31-32). 
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There were different views of whether there was direct or indirect discrimination in this 
case, not only between the Advocate Generals, but also between the parties themselves, the 
Member States involved and between academic commentators (Howard, 2017: 351-354; Loenen, 
2017: 63-65; Vickers 2017: 250). The question is important because, as was mentioned, direct 
discrimination cannot be justified, but indirect discrimination can. But, even if indirect discrimination 
is found rather than direct discrimination, the strictness of the application of the justification test 
can influence the outcome of the case.  
Although it was held to be up to the national court to decide whether there was direct or 
indirect discrimination, the CJEU, in Achbita, gave guidance on how to deal with indirect 
discrimination. According to Article 2(2)(b)(i) Directive 2000/78/EC, indirect discrimination is not 
unlawful if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. The CJEU held that a neutrality policy was a legitimate aim, as it was part 
of the freedom to conduct a business, guaranteed by Article 16 EUCFR (Achbita, paras 37-38). 
In considering whether the ban was appropriate and necessary, the CJEU held that the ban 
on visible political, philosophical or religious symbols was justified as long as the ban was genuinely 
pursued in a consistent and systematic manner and thus did not make a distinction between 
different religions or different (religious, philosophical or political) beliefs; as long as the rule was 
limited to customer-facing employees; and, as long as the employer had considered whether the 
employee could be moved to a job without contact with customers (Achbita, paras 40-43). 
The two judgments have come in for a lot of criticism (Bell, 2017; Brems, 2017; Howard, 
2017; Jolly, 2017; Loenen 2017; Spaventa, 2017; Vickers 2017) which can summarised under three 
main points. First of all, the CJEU’s easy acceptance of neutrality as a legitimate aim which can justify 
indirect discrimination has been criticised because the CJEU does not really explain why neutrality 
must be considered a legitimate aim, especially as both cases concerned private employers. Brems 
(2017) sees the acceptance of the expansion of neutrality to the private sphere without the least 
degree of scrutiny as problematic and points out that ‘neutrality can be an easy cover-up for 
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prejudice’ (See also, Howard, 2017: 355-356; Jolly, 2017: 311-312; Loenen, 2017: 65; Spaventa, 
2017). 
Secondly, there is criticism of the way in which the CJEU applies the proportionality and 
necessity test (Bell, 2017; Howard, 2017; Jolly, 2017; Loenen, 2017, Vickers, 2017). The CJEU does 
not appear to apply a very strict proportionality test and does not balance the needs of the 
employer with the disadvantage imposed on the individual employee or with that employee’s right 
to manifest their religion guaranteed by Article 10 EUCFR (Bell, 2017: 795; Howard, 2017: 358-359; 
Jolly 2017: 312).  The CJEU held that the prohibition must be limited to what is strictly necessary and 
concluded that this would be the case if the ban was limited to employees who interact with 
customers (Achbita, para. 42). But was this really necessary to achieve the aim of neutrality? 
Advocate General Kokott stated that the neutrality rule was ‘essential to avoid the impression that 
external individuals might associate with G4S itself or with one of its customers, or even attribute to 
the latter, the political, philosophical or religious beliefs publicly expressed by an employee through 
her dress’ (Opinion, AG Kokott, para. 95). However, it can be questioned if this really happens in 
practice. Kokott did not bring forward or refer to any evidence for this (Howard, 2017: 356; Jolly 
2017: 312-313). Loenen (2017: 67) points out that the condition that a neutrality policy needs to be 
limited to workers who interact with customers ‘still leaves a very large group of workers exposed to 
the negative effects of a ban on religious clothing or symbols’. And, according to Bell (2017: 796), ‘it 
would surely be firmly rejected if an employer sought to place other groups vulnerable to 
discrimination in job roles that avoided contact with customers’.  
The other condition is that the employer should offer the employee a non-customer facing 
role, but only if this can be achieved taking into account the inherent constraints to which the 
undertaking is subject, and without the employer being required to take on an additional burden 
(Achbita, para. 43). Therefore, this requirement is not very onerous on the employer, especially not 
if compared with the duty of reasonable accommodation an employer has towards disabled people 
(Loenen, 2017: 67). With Vickers (2017: 252) we can conclude that confining protection for religious 
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expression to non-visible or back room roles does not promote equality for minority groups. The 
effect is to restrict not only employment opportunities but also broader inclusion, thereby creating 
invisibility for religious minorities (Vickers, 2017: 252). 
The third major point of criticism is the uncertainty about the level of discretion left to the 
Member States to decide how to regulate the wearing of religious symbols in employment (Howard, 
2017: 360-361; Loenen, 2017: 66-67; Vickers, 2017: 244-247, 249). Before the judgments and the 
opinions came out, Loenen and Vickers (2015: 170-177) discussed whether the CJEU should follow a 
deferential approach to national practice in relation to the wearing of religious symbols in 
employment or whether it should not do so and concluded that powerful arguments exist for both 
sides (see also: Loenen, 2012: 117-119). Advocate General Kokott favoured giving a measure of 
discretion to national authorities and courts in applying the proportionality test as she considered 
that the CJEU does not necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the EU 
(Opinion AG Kokott, Achbita, para. 99). Jolly (2016: 677) points out that this ‘has the effect of 
denoting religious discrimination among a hierarchy of protected characteristics’. According to 
Vickers (2017: 249), the CJEU ‘generally upheld the use of national courts’ discretion and concluded 
that religious dress at work could be fairly readily restricted’. Vickers (2017: 253) concludes that the 
CJEU ‘failed to set clear and consistent standards across the various strands of equality law’. 
The critical commentary on the cases suggests that the CJEU has placed religion or belief as 
discrimination ground close to the bottom of the hierarchy, just above age, as direct age 
discrimination can be justified when this is proportionate and necessary, while direct religion or 
belief discrimination can only be justified when there is a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement and the CJEU, in Bougnaoui, has interpreted this requirement strictly. However, the 
CJEU, in Achbita and Bougnaoui, has applied a rather more lenient justification test then it generally 
applies to justification of other grounds of discrimination. Loenen and Vickers (2015: 175) wrote 
before the judgments, that ‘if the CJEU decides to take a deferential approach to equality when 
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religious issues are involved, then, it will effectively introduce a hierarchy as between equality rights’ 
and this is what the CJEU appears to have done.  
But why did the CJEU apply this more lenient justification test in relation to religion and 
belief? Political reasons might well play a role here. As Vickers (2017: 254) writes,  
the reasons for the backwards steps in terms of equality [in Achbita and Bougnaoui] can best 
be understood in the context of a deeper reluctance on the part of the CJEU to address 
issues of state sovereignty which arise when considering the highly contentious question of 
the proper scope of protection for religion or belief in Europe. 
Loenen (2017: 48) points to the widely diverging approaches to religion and belief across Europe and 
suggests that ‘minimalism and ambiguity in the judgment provide a way to arrive at some sort of 
consensus that can be supported by the majority’ (see also: Bell, 2017, 796). As was mentioned in 
the above, political expediency played a role in the fast adoption and the wide scope of Directive 
2000/43/EC and the presence or lack of consensus regarding the legal recognition of same-sex 
partnerships/marriage has been mentioned in relation to the protection of same-sex couples. 
However, there are dangers to applying a more lenient justification test and thus a more 
deferential approach in relation to indirect religion and belief discrimination. First, this would leave 
minority groups with less protection than majority groups and this leads not only to restricting their 
employment opportunities, but also their broader inclusion, as mentioned above (Loenen, 2015: 
119; Vickers 2017: 251-252). As Jolly (2017: 313) points out: employees who want to wear religious 
symbols at work may face a stark choice: ‘be pushed out of sight or lose your job’. This also goes 
against a number of social policy objectives of the EU, including the promotion of inclusion and 
integration and the free movement of workers (Loenen and Vickers, 2015: 173-174). 
Moreover, applying a lenient justification test and applying a deferential approach which 
leaves discretion to the Member States may lead to ‘widely diverging outcomes of transposing the 
equality directives in this area: they may come to mean entirely different things in different 
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countries’ (Loenen, 2012: 119; Loenen and Vickers, 2015: 173). This goes against the fact that the 
CJEU generally aims at uniform application of EU law and at avoiding inconsistencies (Howard, 2017: 
360; Loenen, 2012: 117). 
Finally, it is not in line with the previous case law of the CJEU as the Court, as mentioned, 
has consistently held that exceptions to the principle of equal treatment must be interpreted 
strictly; and, the CJEU, in Bilka Kaufhaus, has also explained that the justification test for indirect sex 
discrimination has three parts: the means chosen must correspond to a real need; they must be 
appropriate to achieving the objective pursued and, they must be necessary to that end.29 The 
application of the justification and proportionality test in Achbita and Bougnaoui can be criticised for 
not following any of these three requirements, as was mentioned above. A consequence of not 
following the CJEU case law in this also carries a risk of levelling down of protection: lowering the 
standards applied for one ground of discrimination might lead to a lowering of standards for other 
grounds as well (Loenen, 2012: 119; Howard, 2017: 361-362; Vickers, 2016). 
The analysis of Achbita and Bougnaoui has shown that ‘religious equality in the workplace 
across Europe is looking like a rather strange kind of equal’ (Jolly (2017: 314) and that the CJEU has 
placed religion and belief close to age discrimination at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
Conclusion 
This article examined the hierarchy of discrimination grounds and the reasons behind it. It analysed 
a number of cases from the CJEU under Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC and the influence of 
these cases on the development of the protection provided against discrimination. Sex 
discrimination was touched upon in relation to the hierarchy but was not further discussed as the 
focus here was on the grounds of discrimination which were not covered by EU anti-discrimination 
law until 2000.  The argument was that the CJEU has generally given a purposive interpretation to 
the provisions and has expanded the protection against discrimination in many cases, although this 
is more extensive for some grounds of discrimination than for others. However, in three recent cases 
22 
 
the CJEU has given a rather narrow and restrictive interpretation and did not continue the trend of 
moving the protection forward that was present in the other cases.    
 Based on the analysis, the conclusion is that the CJEU case law has compounded the 
hierarchy of discrimination grounds. It has strengthened the position of racial and ethnic origin at 
the top of the hierarchy through Feryn and CHEZ. With its expansive interpretations of disability 
discrimination and reasonable accommodation for disabled people in Ring and Werge, it has also 
reinforced the position of disability in its second place in the hierarchy. The CJEU has expanded the 
protection against sexual orientation discrimination in some ways, but it has stopped short of 
pushing the Member States to create some form of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
Whether the Court will change its position in the pending Coman case remains to be seen. If the 
CJEU follows Advocate General Whatelet’s opinion, it will take a big step in that direction.  
 On the one hand, the CJEU judgments in Achbita and Bougnaoui, contain some positive 
aspects: the broad interpretation of ‘religion’; the decision that the wish of a customer not to be 
served by someone in a headscarf was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement; 
and, the fact that the judgment has made clear that a ban on Muslim headscarves alone is unlawful. 
On the other hand, the judgments have placed religion close to the bottom of the hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds because the CJEU did not do a very rigorous justification test: it accepted 
that neutrality was a legitimate aim without much examination of this; it did not take account of the 
effects of a neutrality policy on the individual affected and their freedom to manifest their religion; 
and it did not really consider whether a ban on religious, philosophical or political symbols was really 
necessary to achieve the aim of neutrality. The CJEU also appears to have deferred to the Member 
States by leaving them some discretion, but it was rather vague in indicating how much discretion 
they have.  
This article suggests that the reasons behind the reticence of the CJEU in relation to religion 
and belief and also in relation to the recognition of same-sex relationships are political. There is a 
lack of consensus in the Member States about the proper scope of protection for religion or belief 
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and about the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. It appears that the CJEU wants to tread 
carefully in such areas of contention and try and find a way of deciding these cases which can be 
supported by the majority of Member States. In view of the political sensitivity of these issues, the 
rather reticent approach of the CJEU is understandable. 
However, the Achbita and Bougnaoui judgments put more obstacles in the way of religious 
minorities and hinder both their employment opportunities and their wider social inclusion and 
integration, which are part of EU policy. This could have a specifically detrimental effect on Muslim 
women who want to wear a headscarf in the workplace (Brems, 2017: Loenen, 2017: 67; Vickers, 
2017: 253). These authors point to the potential intersectional discrimination in these cases, where 
both religious and sex discrimination interact. Unfortunately, the CJEU has rejected, in Parris, a claim 
on a combination of discrimination grounds where the claims on either of the separate grounds is 
unsuccessful so it is doubtful if a claim for discrimination on the combined grounds of religion and 
sex would succeed.  
The overall conclusion of this article must be that EU law has created a hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds and that the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger 
than others. The case law of the CJEU has contributed to this hierarchy rather than challenging it 
and, in doing so, has, unfortunately, missed some great opportunities to contribute to a more 
coherent and sustainable regime of EU equality law. 
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